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I. Introduction 
 
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis highlighted the interdependency of financial institutions 
and markets worldwide. Globally, fiscal support packages totalling 3 trillion USD were 
introduced, placing enormous strain on the public finances of a number of countries. 
Estimates of global banking writedowns are currently more than 3 trillion USD. When the 
commercial paper market collapsed, the US alone lost 95 billion USD in value overnight.2  In 
the European Union (EU), in the absence of mechanisms to organize an orderly wind down, 
Member States had no choice but to bail out their banking sector, and state aid to support 
banks continues to mount.3  In the G-7 countries alone, there was 2 trillion USD in lost 
GDP, higher fiscal deficits, millions of lost jobs, and tremendous financial hardship for 
affected individuals.4 Even in jurisdictions such as Canada, with relatively well-managed 
banking systems, a generalized loss of confidence led to a sharp rise in funding costs.5 The 
largest negative effects of the financial crisis on the Canadian economy stemmed from crises 
originating in other countries, with adverse contagion effects on the Canadian banking 
system, making it very difficult for Canadian banks to fund themselves in foreign markets.6 
Bank supervisory authorities and financial institutions now appreciate that financial systems 
must be strengthened to enhance their capacity to withstand shocks.  
 
There is considerable international initiative to devise mechanisms to prevent such failures in 
the future and to create new insolvency resolution schemes to address financial firm failure.  
Bank supervisors and other regulators are trying to discern the appropriate mix of prudential 
oversight and private sector governance.  This paper examines two discreet issues within this 
much larger topic. Part II examines the need for regulatory oversight and coordination in 
preventing liquidity and solvency issues related to banks and other financial institutions.  
Reform is required to smooth out highs and lows within capital cycles and to address the 
need for cross-border resolution mechanisms for bank insolvency. Part III then examines 
the role of bank governance in preventing and addressing bank insolvency, suggesting that 
governance needs to be prudential, pragmatic and prescient if we are to reduce the frequency 
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and severity of future bank failures. 
 
i. Context 
 
The underlying causes of failed financial institutions were complex, and continue to be the 
subject of considerable study. They include the interplay of structured financial products and 
real economic activity, regulatory gaps, inadequate liquidity and capital adequacy standards, 
extreme leveraging that accounted for much of the increase in banks’ returns on equity, and 
a failure to understand the complexity of systemic risk. In the banking sector, the shift to 
self-governance under Basel II resulted in a reduction in overall capital requirements, with 
commercial banks shifting assets from banking to trading books; and an asset-backed and 
mortgage-backed commercial paper market premised on ongoing liquidity, with little 
attention to systemic risk.7 The originate and distribute model of lending resulted in less 
front end assessment of credit worthiness, as lenders were offloading their risk almost 
immediately. Where credit was granted, it was “covenant light”, without the traditional terms 
and conditions that ensured monitoring and early intervention. In the EU, many banks 
operated throughout Europe on a “passport” system, but there was no mechanism to deal 
with the cross-border implications of Europe-wide bank insolvency. There was also a 
tension between short-term returns and long-term sustainability of financial systems, 
compounded by bank compensation practices that rewarded high fees for short-term profit.  
 
The situation was exacerbated by moral hazard issues. In the classic bank finance paradigm, 
stakeholders with an economic interest in the bank have the greatest interest in monitoring; 
yet the existence of credit derivatives complicated this premise by affecting the motivations 
of various stakeholders, creating agency issues and negative externalities.8 Creditors with 
material holdings of derivatives for speculative purposes may have economic interests that 
                                                 
7
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), “Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reach broad 
agreement on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform package”; Press release, 26 July 2010; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of the 
New Regulatory Framework (LEI Report), 2010; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, 2009; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Countercyclical Capital Buffer Proposal”, Consultative Document, 
2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision/Financial Stability Board, Assessing the Macroeconomic 
Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, Interim Report (MAG Report), 
2009, http://www.bis.org; United States Government, The President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, “Policy Statement on Financial Markets,” March 2008,  
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf; Financial Stability 
Forum, “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience,” April 
7, 2008, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/page_3.htm; International Monetary 
Fund, “The Recent Financial Turmoil – Initial Assessment, Policy Lessons, and Implications for Fund 
Surveillance,” April 9, 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf; Andrea Polo, 
“Corporate Governance of Banks: The Current State of the Debate” (SSRN Working Paper, Said Business 
School, University of Oxford, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=958796; Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group III, “Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform,” August 6, 2008, 
http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/; G-20 Study Group, “Report on Global Credit Market Disruptions,” 
October 2008, http://www.g20.org/pub_further_pubs.aspx. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, 
“Looking Back, Moving Forward, Canada and Global Financial Reform”, Remarks to the International 
Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, November 9, 2010. 
8
 Janis Sarra, Credit Derivatives Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability, (London: Network 
for Sustainable Financial Markets, 2008). 
 3
encourage them to cause a credit event such that they realize on their “bet”. Collateralized 
debt obligations meant risk was shed immediately and the positive externalities associated 
with debt governance were lost. The prudential nature of banks was disregarded in a number 
of instances. In other cases, banks thought that they had insulated their core prudential 
banking function by having spin-off entities work in the speculative financial products 
market, but the contagion effect of liquidity crises and inadequate capital to meet calls on 
collateral placed the related entities at risk.  
 
Once the crisis was in full flight, the “lender of last resort” legislation that provided funds 
when banks fail created further moral hazard in that the availability of bailout funds created 
incentives for banks to undertake riskier activities, knowing that directors and shareholders 
would benefit from any financial upside to riskier strategies and that taxpayers would bear 
the consequences of any downside.   
 
These factors, in very broad brush strokes, paint a picture of a financial system that failed to 
appreciate its interdependency or its effect on real economic activity. The situation was 
exacerbated because, notwithstanding that the financial system was globally interconnected, 
the failure of a bank is treated domestically, not internationally. There was no framework for 
the resolution of cross-border financial group or conglomerate insolvency. Even at the 
national level, few jurisdictions had an effective framework for the resolution of domestic 
financial groups. Cross-border resolution of bank failure was also complicated by the 
potential effect of restructuring or liquidation on foreign operations and the lack of capacity, 
or in some instances, willingness, to bear a share of the burden of bank insolvency. 
 
II.   Regulatory Oversight in Preventing and Addressing Illiquidity and Insolvency 
 
i.  Identifying the Structural Problems 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, there was a failure to appreciate the contagion risk associated 
with failure of a large bank. Banks are highly interconnected in interbank, OTC derivatives 
and foreign exchange markets. The structure of the market makes banks simultaneously 
competitors and co-operators, and that degree of interconnectedness undermines the ability 
of an individual bank to control its liquidity and solvency, in turn increasing risk of systemic 
failure.9   
 
The Basel Committee has reported that the way in which risk was assessed by banks was 
highly problematic, observing that in certain portfolios, market and credit risk are 
inextricably linked, and that widely-used conventional approaches that estimate each risk 
type separately and then aggregate them can lead to sizable bias in overall risk estimates.10 
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In some instances, banks had left too much risk on their own books; in other cases, they had 
shed that risk as the original lender, but had acquired considerable risk from the purchase of 
commercial paper in the interbank market or participation in syndicated highly risky and 
improperly priced debt. Once banks started to fail from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage 
meltdown, there was serious contagion within the global financial system. While there had 
been notable financial crises in recent years, the size, intensity and reach of this crisis was 
unique.11 Illiquidity at one bank spread rapidly to other banks. This structural risk increased 
the likelihood of runs on banks and losses by depositors.  There was a lack of any effective 
system-wide oversight, which allowed for the regulatory arbitrage that developed in the 
shadow banking sector, further contributing to the crisis.12 Globally, deposit insurance 
coverage was restricted to the smallest depositors and thus was not of assistance for many 
stakeholders when banks began to fail. 
 
Derivatives were a significant aspect of the financial landscape. Although not the subject of 
this paper, it is important to note that the complex nature of the products, such as credit 
default swaps (CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), index trades and credit-linked 
notes, shifted the market away from primarily a risk management strategy to a highly 
speculative market.13 Risk became “commodified”. The rapid introduction of new complex 
products created systemic risks to financial markets, in turn, to real economies, without the 
monitoring and discipline that occurs for securities markets or traditional commercial 
lending activity. The lack of transparency of products meant that counterparty risk was not 
well-understood or appropriately priced.14 With a complex interlocking set of claims, the 
financial system became increasingly interconnected, operating on a global scale and 
concentrated in a few key financial hubs. The over the counter (OTC) CDS market was ill-
equipped to deal with bank failures and “cascading swaps” as the market tried to settle 
CDS.15  
 
Securitization was also a problem that had not been appropriately identified as a downside 
risk. Securitization was originally aimed at transforming credit risk into market risk by 
pooling loans and issuing tradable claims against the pool; a risk management tool that relied 
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on the liquidity of primary markets for placing asset-backed securities.16 Securitization differs 
from traditional bank lending because banks, after having originated the loans, hold them 
only for a short time before the loans are sold or before the associated risks of the loans are 
sliced into tranches and then sold. When structured appropriately, securitization allows a 
bank to manage credit and other risks of its loan portfolio.17 However, a negative feature of 
securitization by banks was that, in many instances, once fees on the original loan were 
extracted by the bank, the financial risk was passed along to various tranches of debt.  There 
was a failure to understand the incentive effects of this originate and distribute model of 
lending.  The collateralized debt obligations resulted in less front end assessment of credit 
worthiness, as lenders were offloading their risk almost immediately.  The incentive effects 
were that banks’ intermediation function, including screening and monitoring of borrowers, 
was severely impaired and products were mispriced. Once securitization markets became 
illiquid, banks were exposed to heightened risk from exposures to credit risk, such as loans 
that could no longer be securitized, and to market risk, from changes in the mark-to-market 
value of the securitized assets.18  
 
Rating instruments were also outdated, and investors relied too much on credit ratings that 
failed to take account of liquidity risk and the lack of transparency on investments. There 
were conflicts of interest in the way in which credit rating agencies were compensated, 
creating incentives to not be rigorous in assessing and pricing risk of particular financial 
products. When the loan quality of US subprime mortgages worsened, the belated realization 
by agencies resulted in ratings downgrades; investors began to shun the products as they 
could not accurately price risk; there was a rapid spread to other financial products and 
concern emerged regarding the financial health of bank counterparties.19  
 
In identifying the structural problems, it is important to note that a bank’s core business is to 
voluntarily accept a mismatch in the term structure of its assets and its liabilities; and bank 
viability depends on continuous access to liquidity, be it deposits, short-term funding on the 
interbank market, funding in secured financing markets or funding from a central bank as 
the liquidity provider of last resort.20 Banks are compensated for accepting a maturity 
mismatch by the premium charged to creditors.21 Yet too much leverage increases a bank’s 
probability of default, and depositors and creditors will demand a higher risk premium for 
the higher risk of insolvency.22 An important lesson of the crisis is the need to provide for 
more rigorous prudential regulation pertaining to banks’ liquidity risk management.23 
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Mülbert observes that because of the mismatch in the term structure of assets and liabilities, 
banks are subject to creditor runs; and readily available liquidity reserves can be rapidly 
exhausted as most bank assets cannot be quickly liquidated.24 Hence, there is a collective 
action problem in that a race to the money will result in only the first creditors receiving a 
timely and full payout. 
 
An example is Northern Rock, which in 2008 was the fifth largest bank in the UK, and the 
first to experience a crisis in that jurisdiction. The bank was solvent, its assets were sufficient 
to cover its liabilities, but it faced a liquidity problem when institutional lenders stopped 
lending during the sub-prime meltdown.25 Northern Rock sought a liquidity support facility 
from the Bank of England, due to difficulty raising funds to replace maturing money market 
borrowings. The Bank of England could not lend quietly as it would violate the EU Market 
Abuse Directive, but before it announced the financial support, the media leaked the 
information, creating a run on the bank.26 £1 billion, 5% of total deposits, was withdrawn by 
customers the first day the news became public.27 The initial loan was not sufficient to stem 
the exit of capital, and by early 2008, Northern Rock's loan from the Bank of England had 
grown to £28bn.28 There was no market in private bids for the bank that offered sufficient 
value to meet the massive debt and liquidity crisis; and the UK government moved in to 
nationalize the bank for a temporary period, replacing the board of directors.29 The 
government lacked legal powers to address the insolvency on a timely basis.  Insolvency 
administration was not viewed as a viable option as depositors’ claims would have been 
subordinated under UK law and the UK’s deposit insurance scheme was not pre-funded.  In 
January 2010, HM Treasury legislation restructured Northern Rock, dividing it into a “good 
bank” and a “toxic bank”; creating two separate entities, a savings and mortgage bank and 
asset management, allowing the viable business to continue and retaining the toxic assets in 
the other entity.30 
 
The collapse of Northern Rock appears to have been primarily a governance failure. The 
bank's senior management and directors failed to meet their primary responsibility of 
ensuring financial soundness. However, it was also a regulatory failure. The UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) found its supervision of the bank did not meet appropriate 
standards due to high turnover of its senior supervisory staff, a lack of specialist regulators, 
                                                                                                                                                 
European Banking Supervisors, “Consultation Paper on Liquidity Buffers and Survival Periods,” 
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24
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27
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28
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29
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and a lack of continuity of oversight.31 Ironically, the UK Treasury and FSA had conducted 
“war games” during training sessions in 2005, including a simulated failure of Northern 
Rock, during which they discovered that they lacked effective authority to deal with a bank 
collapse in an orderly manner; yet the government concluded at the time that the risk of 
failure of major banks was remote and thus was not a priority in its legislative agenda.32 
 
Also in the UK, Bradford & Bingley was nationalized by the UK government; about 60% of 
its business had been funded through sub-prime lending.33 Like HBOS and Northern Rock, 
it had relied heavily on the mortgage market while other banks had a more diversified and 
broader base.34 Rapidly growing bank illiquidity and insolvency threatened the UK economy. 
In April 2008, the Bank of England launched a scheme to allow banks to temporarily swap 
their high quality illiquid mortgage-backed and other securities for UK Treasury Bills.35  The 
UK Minister of Finance was given the ability to disburse funds in order to establish a new 
financial undertaking or takeover a financial undertaking or its bankrupt estate, either wholly 
or in part.36 Key points of the funding plan included that banks were to increase their capital 
by at least £25bn and could borrow from the government to do so; an additional £25bn in 
capital would be available in exchange for preference shares; £100bn would be available in 
short-term loans from the Bank of England, on top of an existing loan facility worth 
£100bn; and up to £250bn in loan guarantees would be available at commercial rates to 
encourage banks to lend to each other.37  
 
The UK bailout came with ties. It required a guarantee that there would be capital available 
for day to day operations, signalling to creditors that they were protected from future losses. 
There were limits on remuneration for bank executives and restrictions on giving on 
dividends. For example, in return for providing fresh liquidity, the UK government secured a 
promise from RBS and Lloyds not to pay a dividend that year and possibly in additional 
years, and a promise to help people who were struggling to pay their mortgages.38 They were 
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37
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/13/marketturmoil-creditcrunch. The government took a 
controlling stake of up to 60% in RBS, in return for up to £20 billion. Lloyds, which renegotiated its 
takeover of HBOS, received up to £17bn.; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1145554/HBOS-
profit-warning-makes-mockery-37billion-bank-bailout-taxpayers-shares-cut-just-10billion.html.   
38
 Ibid. 
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not to pay any cash bonuses, and agreed to let the government appoint several board 
members.39  
 
In the US, Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008 was due to the interbank market, rather than a 
classic run on the bank. Lehman faced an unprecedented loss as a result of having held on to 
large positions in subprime and other lower-rated mortgage tranches when securitizing the 
underlying mortgages. Losses accrued in lower-rated mortgage-backed securities throughout 
2008, forcing it to sell 6 billion USD in assets, in turn its stock losing 73% of its value as the 
credit market continued to tighten.  In September 2008, Lehman announced a loss of 3.9 
billion USD and its intent to sell off a majority stake in its investment-management business. 
Lehman Brothers Holdings filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings with bank debt of 613 
billion and bond debt of 155 billion.40 It filed in the UK, Japan and other jurisdictions.41 The 
US government made a decision not to bail out Lehman’s and the collapse was a major 
factor in precipitating a full scale financial crisis, given the highly interrelated nature of the 
banking and financial products sector. The crisis quickly spiraled out of control, with 
financial institutions and then businesses falling like dominos. One month later, the US 
Congress enacted the Troubled Assets Recovery Program (TARP) of 700 billion USD to 
purchase US bank toxic assets. 
 
The massive injection of public funds during the height of the financial crisis was highly 
contested in some jurisdictions. In the US and elsewhere, bail-outs did not include the kinds 
of conditions imposed on the banks in the UK, and there was considerable public protest 
that the bail-outs were occurring while executives continued to receive bonuses and working 
people were losing their livelihood, their homes and their pension savings. 
 
The global banking industry has wide variance in capital and governance structures, which 
means that there is differing risk appetite and incentives to monitor management. Pre-crisis 
rules on adequate internal controls, risk management and audit functions did not prevent 
excessive risk taking. Once financial distress occurred, it became evident that there were few 
structures and systems in place to address bank insolvency. The need for a regulatory 
response to oversight of banks is evident, but the nature and extent of that response is a 
complex issue, particularly in light of the wide variation in individual financial institutions 
and the regulatory authorities that supervise their activities, and given recent, growing, 
sovereign financial distress. 
 
Basel II had created disclosure requirements covering quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
overall capital adequacy and capital allocation, as well as risk exposure and assessment, all 
with a view to promoting market discipline.42 Many of its provisions were not really 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. In order to allow the takeover of HBOS by Lloyd’s, the Government volunteered to waive 
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40
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company filed for civil reorganization on September 16, 2008, in Tokyo District Court. On September 20, 
2008, a 1.35 billion USD plan for Barclays to acquire the core business of Lehman, mainly its $960-million 
headquarters and 9,000 former employees, was approved. Nomura Holdings agreed to buy the Asian 
division of Lehman Brothers for $225 million and parts of the European division for a nominal fee of $2. 
42
 Analysts disagree more with respect to the quality of bonds issued by banks than with the quality of 
 9
implemented and others were deficient to address the above-identified problems. 
 
In addition to the interbank dependency issues and the problems associated with 
securitization, the international nature of banking was a factor.  One of the benefits of the 
EU passport system, fluidity of capital, is problematic on insolvency. Banks of member 
states could establish branches without host country approval or supervision, which means 
that if the supervisory oversight in the home jurisdiction is lacking, that risk is being 
transferred to the depositors in host member states, with little or no regulatory oversight in 
that host state.  Recently adopted capital adequacy requirements face the same issue, in 
respect of levels of capital adequacy being adopted in different EU member states.  
 
In May 2010, European governments and the IMF provided a 750 billion Euro bailout 
package.43 The European Central Bank started purchasing government bonds as a short term 
stabilization strategy. 44 Its bond purchase program was to address the shutdown of the 
covered bond market and support longer-term funding of banks and the financing of the 
real economy in the euro area.  In July 2010, 91 banks were evaluated, representing 65% of 
the European Union's banking sector; of those, seven failed European bank stress tests.45 
Concerns continue regarding the health of the European banking system, with many banks 
dependent on the European Central Bank for financing.46 Conditions that accompanied the 
bailouts tightened the definition of what banks could count as highest-quality “tier one 
capital”, the main assets they hold to protect against losses. It also required lenders to hold 
liquid assets sufficient to see them through a 30-day crisis and set a global leverage ratio to 
limit overall bank borrowing.47 For example, the rescue package provided to Greece in 2010 
by the IMF and Eurozone was €110 billion in funds,48 which included a €10 billion support 
fund for the nation’s banks that faced rising bad loans as the economy was shrinking.49 
Included in the package was the requirement that there be no debt restructuring; and that the 
European Central Bank suspend the minimum credit rating required for the Greek 
government-backed assets used in its liquidity operations.50 
 
As a result of the bank failures and the massive bailouts, governments worldwide concluded 
                                                                                                                                                 
bonds issued by other firms; Donald P. Morgan, “Rating Banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque 
industry,” The American Economic Review 92 (2002): 874-888; Giuliano Iannotta, “Testing for 
Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings,” (SDA Bocconi 
Working Paper No. 122/04, June 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=570483. 
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44
 “Monetary and fiscal policies in times of crisis’, speech by José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of 
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Part Nationalized”, Financial Times, October 8, 2008. 
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that the effectiveness and intensity of supervision needs to be strengthened for banks, 
particularly for systemically important institutions. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
suggested that jurisdictions needed to strengthen supervisory mandates, independence, 
resources and methods; and that core financial market infrastructures needed to be 
reinforced to reduce contagion risks and to ensure that critical infrastructure is not itself a 
source of systemic risk.51  
 
The Basel Committee Financial Institutions 2010 Report found that the assumption that 
institutions were too big or too interconnected to fail introduced additional risk and greater 
likelihood of cross-border contagion. It found that prudential measures will not limit the 
potential for increased moral hazard without instituting viable resolution processes for 
financial institutions. It also found that contingency planning is important for cross-border 
financial institutions to deal with financial distress, including cross-border cooperation and 
information sharing. It advocated strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms that reduce 
systemic risk and enhance resiliency of critical financial functions during a crisis.52  
 
The G-20 leaders in November 2010 agreed on comprehensive financial sector reforms to 
reduce the risk of future crises, strengthen banking systems and prevent a future need for 
massive government bailouts. The FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
conducted studies to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of the proposals, assessing the 
benefits and costs of the initial transition period and of strengthening capital and liquidity 
standards over a longer-term period when the proposals are fully implemented.53  
 
ii. Higher Capital and Liquidity Requirements 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s measures to strengthen regulatory standards 
for internationally active banks require banks to carry more capital and liquidity, designed to 
improve the safety and robustness of the global financial system. 
 
Basel III provides for a "macroprudential overlay" to better deal with systemic risk, with a 
significant increase in the required level of capital; an increase in the quality of banks’ capital; 
and a stricter definition of core capital. Basel III sets a new key capital ratio of 4.5 per cent.54 
The reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%. 
                                                 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Risk mitigation techniques, in its view, include: enforceable netting agreements, collateralization, greater 
standardization of derivatives contracts, clearing and settlement through regulated central counterparty 
clearing facilities, and transparency reporting through trade repositories. It also advocated a reduction in the 
complexity and interconnectedness of group structures. 
53
 Basel Committee, “Mag Report”, supra, note 7. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides 
a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters, to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk 
management practices globally.  
54
 From 2 per cent level; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, September 12, 2010, “Group of 
Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards”, 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and 
other qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same 
period. The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed that the capital conservation buffer 
above the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at 2.5% and be met with common equity, after the 
application of deductions.  
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Another objective of Basel III is to reduce systemic risk by reducing procyclicality, i.e. the 
financial system’s tendency to amplify the ups and downs of the real economy, taking 
account of the inter-linkages and common exposures among financial institutions, especially 
for those deemed systemically important. Banks will be required to hold a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress.55 This countercyclical 
buffer would build up during periods of rapid aggregate credit growth where national 
authorities determine the growth is aggravating system-wide risk. The capital held in the 
buffer could then be released in the downturn of the cycle, reducing the risk that available 
credit would be constrained by regulatory capital requirements, and reducing the possibility 
of an adverse cycle of losses and tightening of credit.56 While banks are allowed to draw on 
the buffer during periods of financial distress, they will face restrictions on paying dividends 
and discretionary bonuses.57 The introduction of capital buffers is intended to give banks, in 
co-operation with supervisory authorities, greater scope to vary the amount of capital they 
hold in response to economic circumstances.58 The countercyclical buffer capital is being 
implemented according to national circumstances, to achieve the broader macroprudential 
goal of protecting the banking sector.59 These capital requirements are supplemented by a 
non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures.60  
 
In Canada, the prudential supervisor had long required banks to establish internal targets to 
provide an operating cushion against volatility and unexpected losses from risks, resulting in 
higher capital than required under the Basel agreement. At the outset of the financial crisis, 
the average Tier 1 capital ratio at Canadian banks was 10% and their total capital ratio was 
almost 13%.61  All Canadian banks were able to maintain capital in excess of supervisory 
targets, and none required a bailout.  The Canadian experience illustrates the importance of 
good capital adequacy ratios. It may also illustrate, however, that the amount currently set by 
Basel III may not be sufficient to protect against a further serious banking crisis. 
 
iii. Success Depends on Willingness to Implement 
 
                                                 
55
 Bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%. 
56
 Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision press release: http://www.bis.org/press/p100726.htm, July 
2010, from the one proposed in its December 2009 consultation paper, International framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. At the same time, the BCBS substantially relaxed 
the definition of liquid assets by allowing a broader range of assets to be counted as liquid assets and 
introducing more lenient assumptions regarding such elements as run-off rates. 
57
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, September 12, 2010, Group of Governors and Heads of 
Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards, http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf.  
58
 In July 2010, the BCBS issued for consultation a proposal for a counter-cyclical capital buffer regime, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf.  
59
 Ibid., reporting that a “countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or other 
fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances”. 
60
 Ibid.  In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% 
during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would 
be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 
based on appropriate review and calibration. The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be 
phased in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. By January 2014, banks will have to meet a 4% 
minimum common equity requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of 5.5%. On 1 January 2015, banks will 
have to meet the 4.5% common equity and the 6% Tier 1 requirements.   
61
 Carney, supra, note 7 at 3. 
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One of the real challenges of international sources of law, such as Basel III, is to ensure that 
they are implemented. They require action by national governments around the world. 
Higher capital and liquidity requirements should result in lower-risk banks. The measures 
should reduce the probability and severity of future financial crises; create smoother 
economic cycles that allow economic growth; lower the risk of overinvestment problems due 
to under-pricing of risk; and lower the incidence of spread of financial failure to the global 
financial system.62 However, the Basel III requirements are dependent on countries’ 
willingness to implement the measures. The levels of capital adequacy were hotly contested 
by some jurisdictions throughout the deliberations, resulting in reduction of the amounts 
originally proposed; and there may be some unwillingness to implement even these 
standards. One media report has suggested that the passport system is a big loophole to 
escape higher capital requirements.63 
 
In some instances, there is no capacity to meet the capital adequacy requirements, 
particularly in some emerging Eastern European and other emerging nations.  The World 
Bank’s financing arm was undertaking contingency planning for failure of these nations to 
meet the new standards, even as the ink was drying on Basel III. 
 
Given the dynamic nature of financial markets, there is also a need for jurisdictions to be 
committed to evaluating any changes on an ongoing basis, and to be responsive to the need 
for further adjustment of capital and liquidity standards. 
 
iv.  Issue of Who Pays 
 
Despite the benefits, stronger prudential standards also impose costs on the economy, since 
banks will pass on to their customers the higher costs of carrying more capital and liquidity. 
The Bank of Canada has observed that if given enough time to meet the new capital 
requirements by regulators and markets, banks can generate capital internally over time 
through the retention of earnings; yet they will likely pass on the costs of the higher 
standards to their customers by demanding higher interest spreads, increasing non-interest 
fee income, or reducing operating expenses.64    They can also lower the risk-weighted asset 
denominator of their regulatory capital requirements by slowing the growth of assets that do 
not generate sufficient revenue to justify the extra capital charges; or they can raise additional 
capital by issuing new shares to investors.65  Arguably, given the considerable returns that 
bank investors enjoyed over the pre-crisis period, they should bear some of the costs of new 
capital requirements through lower returns on their equity investment.66 The costs could also 
                                                 
62
 Bank of Canada, supra, note 4 at 5-6. 
63
 P. Jenkins, M. Murphy and S. Goff, Financial Times, April 17, 2011, discussing the Vickers Commission 
on banking. 
64
 In Canada, the Bank of Canada has estimated that “Based on conservative estimates of the cost of 
financial crises to Canada, the Bank calculates the potential benefit from a reduced incidence of crises to be 
approximately $1/2 trillion. Even after subtracting the estimated long-run and transition costs of requiring 
banks to carry more capital and liquidity, the net gains to Canada in present-value terms would still be 
approximately 13 per cent of GDP, equivalent to about $200 billion.” Bank of Canada, ibid. at 2. 
65Ibid. at 14, reporting that “the new capital rules generally reset the balance between conventional 
banking-book and trading-book activities at the margin in favour of traditional banking activities, which, all 
things being equal, should encourage banks to continue their current lending activities”.  
66
 The Bank of Canada observed that costs assume that Canadian banks will not need to reduce their current 
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be borne in part by more modest compensation to senior officers, aligning their 
compensation more directly to the quality of their prudential oversight and success in 
maintaining the safety and soundness of the financial institution.  Some combination of all 
of these strategies may spread the costs over different types of stakeholders, rather than have 
borrowers and depositors bear the costs. 
 
Banks are likely to seek to maintain their return on equity over the longer run, yet the Bank 
of Canada has observed that higher capital and liquidity requirements should make banks 
less risky, thereby reducing the required rate of return on both bank debt and equity.67 It 
observes that given the current exceptionally low level of bank deposit rates and the cost of 
bank debt funding more generally, the wider interest margins will effectively result in higher 
interest rates (lending spreads) on bank loans, which will be passed along to all bank 
borrowers, not just to small and medium-sized businesses, because all banks will be affected 
by the new requirements.68  
 
A reduction in the supply of credit could affect the level of economic output during the 
transition to the new standards. The macroeconomic effects of banks meeting higher capital 
and liquidity requirements may mean that short-term business consumption and investment 
expenditure will be dampened because higher interest margins and tighter lending 
standards.69 However, these costs are likely an appropriate price to allow the system to adjust 
to reduce overall systemic risk.  Arguably it is a better approach than the tax-based bailouts 
that essentially resulted in “privatization of gains” and the “socialization of losses”, which 
placed the burden of bank failure on taxpayers, rather than the banking sector and its 
decision makers. 
 
v. More Appropriate Supervisory Oversight 
 
Banks and other financial institutions can shift their risk profile very quickly. Their exposure 
to risk can also be altered by market developments even without specific actions on the part 
of the bank. A bank’s holdings of financial assets, which include both debt and equity 
securities and hybrid instruments, allows a bank to liquidate its long-term debt arrangements, 
such as commercial and residential mortgages, and shift the value to new assets with a much 
higher risk profile, creating inappropriate solvency risk. More appropriate supervisory 
oversight would increase the likelihood that governance structures are in place to minimize 
such risks. 
 
A number of studies have identified a lacuna in supervisory oversight, in part because the 
assumption was that the self governance set up under Basel II would result in directors and 
officers controlling risk internally; and in part because of the difficulty in attracting and 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 to 20 per cent returns on shareholders’ equity, to adjust to the new rules; ibid. at 5.  
67
 Ibid. at 14. 
68
 Ibid., suggesting that there could be some distributional effects arising from differences in interest 
elasticities and competitive conditions across lending markets. 
69
 Ibid. at 18. The Bank of Canada has suggested that restricting the tightening of capital and liquidity 
requirements to a single country could cause the effect on GDP of lower consumption and investment to be 
partially offset by weaker import demand; weaker GDP growth, together with the downward pressure on 
prices and wages, suggests the probability of a monetary policy response in which the central bank counters 
the drop in output and inflation. 
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retaining expertise within supervisory authorities. In the UK, the FSA found there had been 
limited understanding by its supervisory team of the duties contained in the regulator’s 
“close and continuous” supervision model.70 
 
The degree of regulatory oversight requires normative consideration of the extent to which 
such oversight should be imposed by regulatory standards and supervision and the degree to 
which regulation should promote governance practices that encourage compliance. Put more 
bluntly, what is the degree to which the remedies to the agency issues in bank governance 
should be privately driven or publicly imposed?  In respect of financial institutions, 
regulatory reform is highly influenced by the financial institutions themselves, as they have 
considerable resources to press for regulatory structures that suit their direct interests.  
Given that other stakeholders, such as depositors or insurance policy holders, may not have 
the information, resources or capacity to participate in policy discussions regarding 
regulatory reform, it is important that government build in these perspectives to the greatest 
extent possible. Otherwise, the public interest aspects of financial institution oversight may 
be lacking.  
 
Oversight also needs to be highly dynamic, with an ability to assess its effectiveness and 
respond in a timely way to changes in financial products, financial institution structures and 
market changes. In this respect, there needs to be effective monitoring and assessment of 
any regulatory changes, in order to assess whether they meet the public policy goals 
articulated at the time they were introduced, and arguably, a deliberative public policy 
discussion that accounts for the experience of both institutions and individuals. Such 
processes may be more responsive to changes required, if sufficiently broad perspectives can 
be brought to the deliberative process. The difficult question is what the appropriate degree 
of regulatory oversight is that would reduce systemic risk as well as bank-specific risk, having 
regard to the particular prudential nature of banks and similar financial institutions.  
 
Black and Baldwin have suggested that regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the 
complex problems and the dynamics of regulation in practice, arguing that regulators have to 
regulate in a way that is responsive to five elements: regulated firms' behaviour, attitude, and 
culture; regulation's institutional environments; interactions of regulatory controls; regulatory 
performance; and change.71 They observe that there are strengths and limitations in using 
risk-based regulation to manage risk and uncertainty within the constraints of practical 
circumstances.72 These elements can be considered in discerning the degree to which 
oversight is required to reduce systemic risk.   
 
Given the nature of interests in financial institutions, the need for regulatory or supervisory 
oversight is considerable. Deposit holders and life policy holders place their savings or 
purchase their life insurance or annuities in order to assure some future economic security.  
They do not factor in the risk of the bank or insurance company becoming insolvent in the 
same way that arguably equity investors do. Unlike many equity investors, the depositor’s 
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 Financial Services Authority, supra, note 7. 
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 R. Baldwin and J. Black, “Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation” (2010) 32 Law and Policy at 181-
213. 
72
 Ibid., specifically, the different regulatory tasks of detection, response development, enforcement, 
assessment, and modification. 
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deposits or the policyholder’s life insurance is not invested disposable cash that the deposit 
or policyholder can afford to lose. Arguably, there is a fiduciary obligation by the bank 
officers, given the imbalance in power and vulnerable nature of most depositors and 
policyholders. Hence, some of the arguments that investors should serve as a form of 
discipline of managers through exit or voice are not applicable to such stakeholders of banks 
and insurance companies.  The prudential nature of the financial institution requires a higher 
degree of oversight to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial institution, and to 
protect the economic interests of these stakeholders.  It also requires safety nets for 
vulnerable depositors and life policyholders when regulatory oversight is not sufficient and a 
financial institution becomes insolvent. 
 
In this respect, one normative question is why much of the focus of addressing collapse of 
banks has been “financial safety nets” for major banks, with less concern for broader social 
safety nets for individuals and small businesses harmed by the governance failure of the 
banks. The nature of banks also means that there are public interest aspects to bank 
regulation, both in terms of overall system stability, and in terms of creating a system that 
protects interests across a broad cross-section of society. 
 
A number of jurisdictions have now recognized these issues. The UK announced measures 
to enhance oversight; regulators are to perform an annual review of the business and 
strategic plans of high impact firms, taking into account the stress testing carried out by the 
firm, management actions, and the firm’s view of the likeliest scenarios that could threaten 
its viability.73 Supervisors are to assess the robustness of the firm’s plans to maintain 
adequate capital and liquidity. Supervisory authorities are also to increase the rigour of its 
ongoing supervision under its risk mitigation program, and increase its focus and resources 
on prudential supervision, including stress testing, to ensure that firms have appropriate risk 
management systems and controls.74 
 
A High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
identified some serious shortcomings in the existing system of financial supervision in 
Europe.75 It reported that banks operate across borders, but supervision remains mostly at 
national level, uneven and often uncoordinated. Many technical rules are determined at 
member state level, and there is considerable variation. Even where rules are harmonized, 
application is inconsistent. It has observed that the fragmented supervision undermines the 
EU single market, imposes extra costs for financial institutions, and increases the likelihood 
of bank insolvency.  The report concluded that a stronger financial sector in the EU in the 
future must have convergence between member states on technical rules, and a mechanism 
for ensuring agreement and co-ordination between national supervisors of the same cross-
border institution. It proposed a rapid and effective mechanism to ensure consistent 
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application of rules, as well as co-ordinated decision-making in emergency situations.  
 
vi. Strengthen National Bank Insolvency Resolution Frameworks 
 
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King observed that “banks may be global in life, but 
they are national in death”.76  Even where a financial institution has highly integrated debt 
and asset structures, insolvency workouts are the jurisdiction of individual domestic 
insolvency systems. There is a tension between international efforts to harmonize regulation 
in global financial markets and the actual effects of bank failure on national systems, subject 
to national laws, with the costs borne by taxpayer resources. Responses to bank failures need 
to be timely and effective; and in the majority of cases, such responses will fall to national 
regulators and national resolution schemes. Any regulatory innovation must be responsive to 
these tensions.  
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has noted that a lack of 
provisions allowing refinancing and fair and equitable voting on a plan of reorganization are 
among common weaknesses that should be addressed in future reform efforts.77 Mario 
Draghi, Chair of the FSB, has observed that systemically important institutions will operate 
with correct incentives only if an effective resolution framework is in place and that many 
countries lack these powers, the tools and operational capacity. He suggests that statutory 
powers enabling the resolution authority to bail-in senior debt holders would expand the 
options for going concern resolution.78   
 
The FSB is developing common principles to strengthen national resolution powers for 
financially distressed financial institutions and to ensure firm-specific contingency planning; 
suggesting that such principles will reduce contagion, help to achieve greater consistency 
among national resolution frameworks, and improve coordination of resolution measures 
across borders.79 It suggests that all jurisdictions should have in place a policy framework to 
reduce the moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions in 
their jurisdictions; and should have effective resolution tools that enable the authorities to 
resolve financial firms without systemic disruptions and taxpayer losses. Effective resolution 
schemes should include authority to facilitate a “going concern” capital and liability 
restructuring as well as “gone concern” restructuring and wind-down, including measures 
such as the establishment of a temporary bridge bank to take over and continue operating 
certain essential functions.80 The G20 has subsequently agreed that every country should 
have a rapid resolution mechanism for all systemically important financial institutions. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recommended that: “National authorities 
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should have appropriate tools to deal with all types of financial institutions in difficulties so 
that an orderly resolution can be achieved that helps maintain financial stability, minimize 
systemic risk, protect consumers, limit moral hazard and promote market efficiency. Such 
frameworks should minimize the impact of a crisis or resolution on the financial system and 
promote the continuity of systemically important functions. Examples of tools that will 
improve national resolution frameworks are powers, applied where appropriate, to create 
bridge financial institutions, transfer assets, liabilities, and business operations to other 
institutions, and resolve claims.”81 
  
 1. UK Initiatives 
 
Prior to 2008, the UK did not have a statutory regime for dealing with failing banks. The 
Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 temporarily provided the Treasury with powers to 
facilitate an orderly resolution to maintain financial stability or protect the public interest.82 
The UK then enacted the Banking Act, 2009, which establishes a permanent special 
resolution regime (SRR), providing authorities with tools to deal with financially distressed 
banks.83 There are three stabilization options: transfer to a private sector purchaser, transfer 
to a bridge bank and transfer to temporary public sector ownership. The authority under the 
Act includes the ability to effect the transfer of shares and other securities or property, rights 
and liabilities; and assess any compensation payable to transferors for the shares or other 
property transferred and for third parties affected by a transfer.84  
 
The Banking Act, 2009 also establishes a new bank insolvency procedure, to provide for the 
orderly winding up of a failed bank and the facilitating of rapid payments by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to eligible claimants, or a transfer of such accounts 
to another financial institution.85 There is a new bank administration procedure where there 
has been a partial transfer of business from a failing bank. A bank administrator may be 
appointed by the court to administer the affairs of an insolvent residual bank, created where 
part of the bank has been transferred to a private sector purchaser or to a bridge bank under 
the SRR.86  
 
The Act formalizes the Bank of England’s role in the oversight of inter-bank payment 
systems, given the inter-linkages between payment systems, banks and other financial 
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intermediaries, where payment systems problems have the potential to spread through the 
financial system.87  The Act gives the Treasury considerable authority to make regulations 
concerning the fiscal consequences of the exercise of any stabilisation power, including the 
ability to modify an enactment with retrospective effect for up to three months prior to the 
date on which the stabilisation power was exercised.88 The Treasury also has authority to 
amend the law retroactively for the purpose of facilitating the Act’s special resolution 
objectives, where desirable or necessary to give effect to the particular exercise of its power 
under the statute.89 The Government can introduce, if needed, a new insolvency regime for 
investment banks, designed to secure the expeditious return of client assets following the 
failure of an investment banking institution.90  
 
2. New European Union Framework 
 
On 22 September 2010, the European Parliament, following agreement by all member states, 
approved a new supervisory framework for financial regulation in Europe, effective January 
2011.  The European Commission (EC) has set out a framework for dealing with bank 
insolvency and future crises in the financial sector.91 In particular, it will provide a 
supervisory framework to allow banks to fail without bringing down the entire financial 
system, or risking that taxpayers are called on to pay the costs.  It is part of the larger G20 
strategy that no bank should be "too big or too interconnected to fail”. Legislative proposals 
in 2011 encourage all member states to put in place an efficient crisis management regime, 
including tools to address bank crises at an early stage. The measures include: 
 
o Preparatory and preventative measures, such as a requirement that institutions prepare 
bank recovery and resolution plans to ensure adequate planning for financial stress or 
failure, what the EC has called "living wills". 
 
o Powers to take early action to remedy problems before they become severe, such as 
powers for supervisors to require the replacement of management, require institutions to 
adopt changes to business operations and/or corporate structure necessary to ensure 
that resolution is viable; requirements to limit or modify exposures; or to require an 
institution to implement a recovery plan or to divest itself of activities or business lines 
that pose an excessive risk to its financial soundness. 92  Supervisors' powers will include 
powers to prohibit payment of dividends. 
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o Resolution tools, such as powers to effect the takeover of a failing bank or a solvent 
institution, or to transfer all or part of its business to a temporary bridge bank, which 
would enable authorities to ensure the continuity of essential services and to manage the 
failure in an orderly way. 
 
o The EC has also set out its ideas for pre-funded bank resolution funds to ensure that the 
banking sector, and not the taxpayer, pays the costs of future bank failures. 
 
The EC Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) currently provides early intervention powers 
for prudential supervisors to impose measures on banks that fail to meet requirements of the 
Directive; however, those powers will be enhanced.93 Each member state will identify a 
resolution authority to exercise the resolution powers. The EC will require the annual 
preparation of a supervisory program for each bank on the basis of a risk assessment; greater 
and more systematic use of on-site supervisory examinations; more robust standards and 
more intrusive and forward-looking supervisory assessment.94 The objective is to allow 
authorities to take action before a bank is balance sheet insolvent.   
 
An outstanding issue is what is the threshold for intervention? Should it be a requirement 
that an institution be in serious distress without any realistic prospects of recovery in a 
specified timeframe?95 The EC has suggested that possible threshold conditions aimed at the 
solvency of an institution include an assessment by supervisors that the bank has incurred or 
is likely to incur losses that will deplete its regulatory capital; that its assets are likely to be 
less than its liabilities; that it is likely to be unable to pay its obligations in the normal course 
of business; or it does not have adequate resources to carry on its business; or a supervisory 
assessment that the institution no longer meets, or is expected to fail to meet, the conditions 
of its licence to carry on banking.96 There will also be a public interest test, such as “if 
winding up the institution under ordinary insolvency proceedings did not ensure the stability 
of the financial system or continuity of essential financial infrastructure services”, then the 
institution should be wound up once the threshold for insolvent liquidation is reached.97 
 
The EC has observed that it will not always be feasible to liquidate a bank under ordinary 
insolvency proceedings.98 In some cases, an orderly winding down through resolution will be 
necessary in the public interest, for reasons of financial stability, to minimize contagion, 
ensure continuity of vital economic functions, maximize the value of remaining assets and 
facilitate their return to productive use in the private sector. It suggests that measures aimed 
at maintaining the entity as a going concern, such as the power to write down debt or 
convert it to equity, should be a last resort. Where banks are at a point of failure, the three 
options are: ordinary liquidation, including sale of all or part of the business; orderly wind-up 
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of a gone-concern, and restructuring as a going concern.99  Resolution powers should include 
a bridge bank tool that would enable authorities to transfer some or all the business of a 
failing bank, including its deposits, to a temporary bridge bank;100 an asset separation tool to 
enable authorities to transfer underperforming or 'toxic' assets to a separate vehicle (“bad 
bank”) in order to “cleanse” the balance sheet of a troubled bank; powers to write off or 
cancel shares; a tool to write down or convert debt of a failing bank; and power to impose a 
temporary moratorium on the payment of claims.101 The EC’s guiding principle for 
compensation is that affected stakeholders should suffer no greater loss than they would 
have if the institution had been wound up under the applicable insolvency regime.102  
 
The overriding objective of the EC initiative is to ensure that banks can fail without 
jeopardizing wider financial stability, thus minimizing the risk of contagion. It is also aimed 
at ensuring continuous access for depositors to their accounts, the underlying notion being 
that essential banking services must continue even if a bank is allowed to fail. Under the 
proposal, national funds should be set up on the basis of contributions paid by banks, to 
fund the cost of future bank resolution measures and facilitate advance planning on how the 
costs of resolving cross-border institution distress should be shared without imposing costs 
on the tax base.103 Such funds are aimed at the moral hazards associated with government 
bail-outs.104  
 
The EC has also recognized the challenge of branch banks under the EU passport system by 
proposing that there must be arrangements to allow authorities to effectively coordinate and 
cooperate as fully as possible in cross-border bank insolvency proceedings.  
 
The framework consists of a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor and 
assess potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-economic developments 
and from developments within the financial system as a whole.  The ESRB is to provide 
early warning of system-wide risks that may be building up, given cross-sectoral and 
interconnected banks, and, where necessary, issue recommendations for action to deal with 
these risks.  The framework also consists of three new European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESA) for the financial services sector, retooled from pre-crisis authorities: a European 
Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, a European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt, and a European Securities and Markets Authority 
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(ESMA) in Paris. The new authorities will be made up of the 27 national supervisors. The 
new European Supervisory Authorities, and in particular, the European Banking Authority, 
have coordination and support roles in crisis situations.  
 
The ESA will undertake micro-prudential supervision, working with the existing national 
supervisory authorities to safeguard financial soundness at the level of individual financial 
firms and protect consumers of financial services. It will have the power to draw up specific 
rules for national authorities and financial institutions; develop technical standards and 
guidelines; monitor how rules are being enforced by national supervisory authorities; take 
action in emergencies, including the banning of certain products; mediate and settle disputes 
between national supervisors; ensure the consistent application of EU law, and, where 
necessary, settle disagreements between national authorities in areas that require cooperation, 
coordination or joint decision-making by member state supervisory authorities.105 
 
The banking proposals are part of a broader initiative to regulate financial services in the 
future.106 The EC has observed that in order to strengthen the reforms of the European 
supervisory architecture, a single European rulebook is needed to provide a common legal 
basis for supervisory action in the EU, in turn enhancing stability, equal treatment, lower 
compliance costs and a reduction in opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.107 Day-to-day 
supervision of banks will continue at the national level. The EC is to publish a report every 
three years on the functioning of the new authorities and assess whether further steps are 
needed to ensure the prudential soundness of institutions and protection of depositors, 
policy-holders and investors.108  
 
The new Authorities will be able to make decisions directly applicable to financial 
institutions as a last resort where the Authority has asked the national supervisor to act and it 
has not complied; to be done only in cases where there is directly applicable EU legislation. 
The regulations establishing the new Authorities have a “fiscal safeguard clause”, which 
prohibits them from taking any decisions that impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of 
member states. The Authorities may temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial 
activities that threaten the orderly functioning, integrity or stability of the whole or part of 
the financial system in Europe.109  Thus the balance between member state autonomy and 
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the authority of these new entities to act in specified circumstances for the benefit of the 
European financial system is a fragile one. 
 
The new Authorities will also participate actively in the development and coordination of 
effective and consistent recovery and resolution plans, guarantee schemes, procedures in 
emergency situations and preventive measures to minimize the systemic impact of any 
failure.110 Their goal is to have a specialized and ongoing capacity to respond effectively to 
the materialization of systemic risks.  
 
The overriding objective of a European resolution framework is that distressed banks of any 
type and size should be allowed to fail without risk to financial stability, at the same time, 
avoiding costs to taxpayers. The EC’s framework for prevention, crisis management and 
resolution is aimed at: 
 
o Making prevention and preparation a priority, through comprehensive planning and 
preventive measures that help authorities and firms prepare for resolution. 
o Early supervisory intervention, by providing tools to resolve institutions in a way that 
minimizes risks of contagion and ensures continuity of essential financial services. 
o Enabling timely and decisive action, through well defined powers and processes 
addressing when and to what extent authorities can intervene. 
o Reducing moral hazard by ensuring that the costs of resolution should be borne by 
bank shareholders and, where needed, creditors, reflecting the normal hierarchy of 
claims. If necessary, the banking industry as a whole should bear the costs. 
o Contributing to a smooth resolution of cross-border groups to ensure minimum 
disruption to the internal market, including fair sharing of costs and preservation of 
essential banking services. 
o Ensuring legal certainty, appropriate safeguards for third parties and restricting any 
interference with property rights to what is necessary and justified in the public 
interest. Creditors should receive treatment similar to what they would receive on a 
winding-up.  
o Limiting competition distortions that could result from interventions. State aid 
granted under the resolution framework is to be compatible with the Treaty rules and 
the internal market.111 
 
The European Commission is considering supplementary mechanisms designed to enable 
large complex financial institutions (LCFI) to continue as a going concern, so that they can 
be reorganized or, where appropriate, have certain activities wound down in an orderly 
manner that minimizes contagion and protects financial stability. One option is to write 
down all equity and the conversion of the debt of a troubled bank into equity, to restore its 
capital position to allow it to continue as a going concern temporarily or permanently.112 
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However, the EC has not yet resolved a number of policy questions, such as: should there be 
statutory power for authorities to write down or convert debt under specified conditions, or 
mandatory contractual terms for write down or conversion that would be required to be 
included in a proportion of the debt issued by financial institutions;113 the impact on the cost 
of financing and the need to regulate the liabilities side of the balance sheet; the complexities 
of applying this tool to a cross-border group, and the need to ensure recognition of any write 
down or conversion by foreign courts where the debt governed by the law of a non-EU 
jurisdiction.  The Basel Committee has suggested that if home and host authorities deem 
that a bank’s structure is too complex to be resolved in an orderly way, they should demand 
changes to its legal and operational structure.114 Such a proposal may be unlikely to be 
adopted, absent shared goals and a shared framework for resolution of bank insolvency. 
 
The EC has observed that an integrated framework for resolution of cross-border entities by 
a single European body would deliver a rapid, decisive and equitable resolution process for 
European financial groups, but that it would be difficult to establish an EU integrated 
resolution model for cross-border banking groups in the absence of a harmonized 
insolvency regime and of a single European supervisory authority for those entities.  
 
Thus, the EC has proposed a coordination framework based on a network of harmonized 
resolution tools and a requirement for authorities to consult and cooperate when resolving 
affiliated entities. There are to be “resolution colleges”, where supervisors and national 
authorities in charge of resolution would meet for the purposes of crisis planning and the 
preparation of resolution plans.115  It suggests that group level resolution authorities should 
have the power to decide in cases of group failure whether a group resolution scheme is 
appropriate; and pending any decision, national authorities would be required to refrain from 
adopting national measures that could prejudice the effectiveness of the group resolution 
scheme.116 The production of a group resolution scheme in appropriate cases is aimed at 
facilitating coordinated resolution; but the EC observes that because resolution powers are 
applied to individual legal entities and the competence for resolution would remain national, 
the group resolution scheme would not be binding.117 The EC also advocates development 
of firm specific cooperation agreements between the national authorities responsible for 
managing the failure of global firms, with a view to ensuring effective planning, decision-
making and coordination in respect of international groups globally.118 
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The EC is considering measures that would specify the circumstances and conditions under 
which institutions may transfer assets within a group, including in situations where group 
entities are experiencing liquidity stress; to establish an enabling framework for intra-group 
liquidity management that includes safeguards to preserve financial stability in member states 
where transferring entities are established, and to protect the rights of creditors and 
shareholders.119 
 
The EC has observed that its requirement to prepare a recovery plan should be applied 
proportionately, reflecting the size of the firm, the nature of its sources of funding and the 
degree to which group or other sectoral support would be credibly available.120 Institutions 
would be required to submit plans to supervisors for assessment of comprehensiveness and 
ability to restore the viability of the institution. The requirement for up to date resolution 
plans at both the entity and group level would apply to all credit institutions covered by the 
regime, with the aim of ensuring the planning necessary to enable the bank’s business to be 
transferred or wound down in an orderly manner in the event of its failure.121 Resolution 
plans would require details on group structure, intra-group guarantees and service level 
agreements, contracts and counterparties, debt liabilities, custody arrangements, as well as 
operational information about IT systems and human resources. The EC has noted that 
powers to change the bank’s group legal structure and business arrangements are intrusive, 
and appropriate checks and balances will be necessary, including a right for the firm to 
challenge any requirement for restructuring imposed by the resolution authority.122 Any 
provision of financing in support of resolution, including capital, liquidity, guarantees or 
other measures, must comply with the EU Treaty and the state aid framework where it 
involves the use of state resources and where an advantage could distort competition and 
affect intra-EU trade.123 
 
These initiatives recognize the challenges of coordinating cross-border proceedings. 
Essentially, if banks and other financial institutions want the ability to operate in the EU, 
they will have to bear the costs of preventive planning and ongoing reporting of risks and 
recovery plans. The transparency and reporting requirements impose substantial transaction 
costs on financial institutions; however, arguably the costs are appropriate given both the 
costs of the recent bailouts and the continuing risks associated with their failure to be 
prudent in their banking activities.  The new structures assume good faith compliance by 
individual financial institutions across state borders, which may not be what will occur in 
practice. 
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EU banks will be required to contribute to ex ante funds, backed by financing arrangements 
to ensure that financing is available irrespective of the size of a failed bank; and any costs 
exceeding the capacity of the fund will be subsequently recovered from the banking sector.124 
Each resolution fund will receive contributions from banks licensed in the same member 
state, and the contribution would cover their branches established in other member states. 
The EC would prefer full harmonization based primarily on liabilities as a proxy for the 
costs of resolution, however, it is also considering whether Member States should be given 
the flexibility to decide on a different basis for contributions, if it would not distort the EU 
market. The EC has recognized that there is a need to “calibrate the size of harmonized 
national funds in view of the burdens imposed by other financial sector reforms”, phasing in 
funds as the economy recovers.125 
 
Bank oversight must be accompanied by initiatives in related areas of financial and capital 
markets. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has 
recommended strengthening its oversight to include identifying and addressing systemic 
risks; cooperating in development and promotion of adherence to consistent standards of 
regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, encourage fair and 
efficient markets and reduce systemic risk.126  
 
In the midst of these policy reforms in the euro area, the European Central Bank, in order to 
meet banks’ increased demand for liquidity and to reduce uncertainty, introduced an 
“enhanced credit support” policy, which included the introduction of new long-term 
refinancing operations and extended the list of collateral eligible for monetary policy 
operations.127 By allowing banks to continue rolling-over their short and medium-term 
financing, the liquidity provision of the ECB avoided a fire-sale of assets.128  The ECB has 
observed that during the initial stages of the crisis, the policy response to the crisis involved 
a transfer of risk from the private sector to the government sector; however, as deficits 
surged and it become evident that government deficit in countries such as Greece were 
much larger than previously understood, the attention focused more on the state of public 
finance and the difficulty in pricing sovereign debt risk. It notes that after the downgrading 
of Greek bonds by the major rating agencies, the financial crisis that originated in the US 
turned into a sovereign debt crisis with a European epicentre.129 Europe now faces pressing 
concerns regarding the ability of some euro area countries to honour their debt obligations, 
and policy measures are required to stabilize the financial sector, a discussion that space does 
not permit here. The ECB observes that slower than expected recovery and overstretched 
public finances have made investors and consumers retrench in 2011 and in order to diffuse 
tensions in the euro area secondary sovereign bond market, the ECB in August resumed 
some of its exceptional liquidity programs.  It notes that “The fundamental reason for this 
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public role is that private agents, typically, are not large enough players to internalize the 
general equilibrium – or even market specific – consequences of their portfolio decisions (as 
in the case of fire sales). These results warrant ample liquidity injections by central banks and 
underpin the current wave of regulatory reforms undertaken in the European Union as well 
as.”  
 
Thus notwithstanding many policy initiatives, EU banks are currently facing sharp rises in 
borrowing costs and considerably reduced access to financial markets. Combined with high 
levels of sovereign debt and a slowing global economy, there may be a new wave of bank 
insolvencies and contagion internationally.  The EC initiatives have not yet allowed it to gain 
control of the euro zone financial crisis.  Moreover, while the policy commitment is one of a 
centralized support strategy for bank and sovereign debt, there are rising tensions between 
countries that have surpluses, such as Germany, and countries that have huge account 
deficits, such as Greece and Ireland. The European Central Bank can supply considerable 
liquidity to European banks, but it is a short-term bridging measure that cannot remedy the 
continuing financial situation. There is a need to create comprehensive financial reforms; 
adopt significant changes to fiscal policies; implement sustainable government debt; and 
address problems associated with the EU’s inflexible exchange rates.  Canada’s central bank 
has argued that what is needed now is a comprehensive capital plan for European banks, 
including a sizeable funding backstop for European sovereigns, suggesting that European 
authorities need time to recreate their monetary union based on credible fiscal arrangements 
and more flexible economies.130  
 
 3. US Reforms 
 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act has established a resolution framework for systemic 
institutions at a group level.131 A massive piece of legislation, it assigns oversight 
responsibility to numerous government agencies and requires the promulgation of several 
hundred additional rules.  The Act is aimed at ending taxpayer funds to bail out financial 
firms by creating a mechanism to liquidate failed banks, creating capital and leverage 
requirements that make it undesirable to get too big. The legislation changes the Federal 
Reserve’s emergency lending authority to allow system-wide support, but prohibits bailing 
out an individual company.132  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can 
borrow only the amount of funds to liquidate a bank that it expects to be repaid from the 
assets liquidated, with the government holding a priority claim for repayment.133  The Dodd-
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Frank Act strengthens oversight and empowers regulators to aggressively pursue financial 
fraud, conflicts of interest and manipulation of the system.   
  
The reforms create a council to identify, provide advance warning and address systemic risks 
posed by large, complex companies, products, and activities before they threaten the stability 
of the economy.134 It also is aimed at eliminating loopholes that allow what it calls “risky and 
abusive practices” to go unregulated, including in the OTC and asset-backed securities 
markets. The Financial Stability Oversight Council will monitor systemic risk and make 
recommendations to the Federal Reserve for stricter rules for capital, leverage, liquidity, risk 
management and other requirements as companies grow in size and complexity.  The 
Council is mandated to create enhanced prudential standards for systemically important 
firms. It can require a large, complex company to divest some of its holdings if it poses a 
“grave threat” to the financial stability of the US, although the mechanism is considered a 
“last resort” type of authority. 135 Large bank holding companies that have received TARP 
funds will not be able to avoid Federal Reserve supervision by dropping their banks.136 It 
requires regulators to implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and holding 
companies, to limit relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds.137 The reforms 
provide a specific framework for promoting uniform risk-management standards for 
systemically important financial market utilities and clearing and settlement activities of 
financial institutions.138  
 
The Dodd-Frank Act also contains provisions on derivatives and oversight of hedge funds 
and credit rating agencies, and provisions regarding say on executive pay, with the plan to 
develop regulatory restrictions to prohibit compensation that encourage excessive risk-
taking. Of note is that the statute adds credit exposure from derivative transactions to banks’ 
lending limits.  The derivatives issues are particularly complex, and arguably, the reforms 
have done little to temper the speculative aspects of the market. The Bank for International 
Settlements reports that the market for OTC derivatives in 2010 was still thriving, with 582 
trillion USD in total notional amount of outstanding derivatives.139 Among the important 
issues in respect of derivatives that have not been addressed to date is the fact that 
derivatives are not subject to the mandatory stay under insolvency law, arguably giving such 
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products an inappropriate preference on the insolvency of the financial institution and 
perhaps reducing the potential effectiveness of bank resolution schemes.140  
 
The new US legislation requires large, complex financial companies to periodically submit 
plans for their rapid and orderly shutdown should the company go under, on potential 
sanction of higher capital requirements and restrictions on growth, activity and divestment, 
should they fail to submit acceptable plans. It creates an orderly liquidation mechanism for 
FDIC to unwind failing systemically significant financial companies. Shareholders and 
unsecured creditors are to bear the losses instead of taxpayers; and management and 
culpable directors will be removed. It requires that Treasury, FDIC and the Federal Reserve 
all agree to put a company into the orderly liquidation process to mitigate serious adverse 
effects on financial stability.141  
 
The effects of the more than a thousand pages of legislative reforms in the US will not be 
evident for some time; they require several hundred rules to be promulgated and brought 
into force. Overall, the bank-related reforms are aimed at increased supervisory oversight of 
financial institutions.  There do not challenge the underlying structure of the industry or its 
incentive effects in any substantive manner. This fact has become evident recently as the US 
has embarked on its efforts to move from public support to private sector support, but 
arguably, the shift is not properly supported by private market capital, which is still 
experiencing the effects of the negative shocks from the financial crisis.142  
 
In terms of the new US bank resolution provisions, Stephen Lubben has observed that the 
insolvency liquidation provisions under Dodd-Frank are more akin to liquidation under 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code than the Code’s Chapter 7 liquidation provisions, and in 
that respect, do not really put an end to “too big to fail”.143  He suggests that regulators’ 
willingness to enforce the “living will” recovery plans prior to financial distress will have a 
large impact on whether or not the orderly liquidation procedures will be effective.  He 
observes that orderly liquidation of a financial institution is dependent on FDIC’s ability to 
provide ongoing liquidity and thus amounts to a form of public bailout.  However, it may be 
necessary, given the complexity and interdependency of financial institutions.  Lubben 
suggests that the speed with which the process can take place and the availability of 
financing are two important aspects of the new regime, particularly since the private sector is 
unlikely in many cases to be able to provide the interim financing that a bank of any 
substantial size would require during the process.144 FDIC financing will prevent the bank’s 
financial distress to spread to counter-parties.  However, Lubben suggests that the lack of 
clarity in when the provisions can or should be accessed has created unneeded uncertainty 
with regard to the resolution of distressed financial institutions.145  
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4. Summary 
 
Overall, these reforms address a number of the issues raised by the lack of appropriate bank 
resolution schemes.  The policy discussions draw on broad notions of the public interest in 
viable but stable financial markets and the need to protect vulnerable participants. Safety and 
soundness of financial institutions is viewed as absolutely vital to financial and economic 
markets.  Yet the reforms are limited in their scope.  They fail to fully comprehend the role 
of derivatives in financial markets, and thus related reforms are directed towards disclosure 
and central clearing and settlement systems rather than addressing the profound impact such 
products have on insolvency resolution processes. They do not address the speculative and 
distributive features of such products and the interrelationship of those features with bank 
solvency and protection of vulnerable stakeholders.  There is also, arguably, still insufficient 
attention being paid to the issue of who pays for the safety and soundness of the system and 
at what point that payment is made, in the form of capital requirements, prefunding of 
deposit guarantee funds and bank resolution funds, the use of various products and tools, 
and the incentives created for particular kinds of self-dealing or speculative conduct.    
 
vii. Adoption of a Framework for Cross-Border Bank Corporate Groups and Financial Conglomerates 
 
There is also a pressing need to improve cross-border resolution capacity. Global banks have 
substantial operations across multiple jurisdictions and thousands of legal entities. In the 
absence of a global resolution regime, there needs to be enhanced capacity to co-ordinate 
cross-border restructuring plans for international financial institutions. Such capacity needs 
to recognize the wide variance in both the structure of financial institutions and in the 
various jurisdictions’ normative commitments to rehabilitation or liquidation as the preferred 
outcome of insolvent financial institution insolvency. 
 
A number of financial institutions also have subsidiaries in more than one segment of the 
financial sector, forming part of large financial conglomerates. A financial conglomerate has 
been defined by the Basel Committee as a group of companies under common control, in 
which the exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in two 
or more financial sectors such as banking and insurance.146 Most domestic bank and 
insolvency legislation fails to adequately recognize either the cross-border nature of financial 
institution insolvency or the structure of the industry in terms of its cross-sector holdings.  
Most do not offer any guidance as to how a proceeding involving such entities would 
address the need to deal with multiple types of stakeholders and claims, located in different 
jurisdictions, with differing statutory priorities given to claims, and involving multiple 
compensation funds. 
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Bank groups and financial conglomerates often have highly interconnected debt and asset 
structures. Even where a domestic financial firm is not insolvent, it can be affected by the 
insolvency of related entities. There should be a model banking law, similar to the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency.  The UNCITRAL Model Law, although not expressly prohibiting its 
application to financial institutions, does contain a provision that suggests that the law can 
exclude entities such as banks from the ambit of the provisions;147 and most jurisdictions 
that have adopted the Model Law have done so. Any such model banking law or guidelines 
could adopt the express objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law; specifically, to provide 
mechanisms for dealing with cross-border cooperation between courts and bank authorities; 
the fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of 
creditors, debtors, and other interested persons; the protection and the maximization of the 
value of debtors’ property; and the rescue of financially troubled businesses to protect 
investment and preserve employment.  Any principles addressing cross-border insolvency 
should account for the particular structure of the banking sector. The objectives should be 
refined to recognize depositors and compensation funds as important stakeholders.  
 
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court has broad powers to grant post-recognition 
relief, where satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the debtor’s property or the 
interests of creditors; and it has authority to impose whatever terms and conditions it deems 
appropriate.148 There is a list of the forms of cooperation that may be provided between 
representatives involved in the proceedings, including the appointment of a person to act at 
the direction of the court; court-to-court communication; coordination of the administration 
and supervision of the debtor’s assets and affairs; and coordination of proceedings or of 
concurrent proceedings.149  Adoption for purposes of the financial sector should also include 
depositors and other stakeholders of the financial institution as part of the criteria that the 
court would consider.  The Model Law is largely a procedural mechanism to allow cross-
border cooperation, but it does have substantive protections, such as allowing the courts to 
decline approval of an action where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
jurisdiction. UNCITRAL has recently promulgated guidelines on the treatment of business 
enterprise groups in insolvency, which may assist in formulating similar guidance for 
financial conglomerates.150   
 
Financial conglomerates are exposed to risks related to controlling a group, including 
contagion risk. The EC is also considering reform of oversight of financial conglomerates, 
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which requires amendment to Directive 2002/87/EC ('FICOD'), which in 2003 introduced 
group-wide supplementary supervision.151 The objective of the Directive was to control 
potential risks arising from “double gearing”, which is the multiple use of capital across 
different sectors such as banking and insurance. It was to offer additional supervision where 
there were group risks due to risk of contagion, management complexity, concentration, and 
conflicts of interest that may arise when several licenses for different financial services are 
combined.152  
 
During the financial crisis, group risks materialized all across the financial sector, 
emphasizing the importance of supervision of inter-linkages within financial groups.153 The 
EC has observed that effective supervision of conglomerates differs across sectors, 
increasing the need for robust supervision of financial conglomerates.  Certain smaller EU 
financial groups with a simple structure and few licenses in both sectors may be excluded 
from supplementary supervision, reducing their compliance costs.154 Compliance costs for 
bigger groups, with more than hundred licenses, active in both sectors, could increase as 
such groups, representing about €9 trillion assets in the financial sector, are likely to be 
included in the scope of the supplementary supervision.155  Increased compliance costs could 
also be incurred by financial conglomerates. The EC states that the primary aim of this 
proposal is to fix gaps that have evolved in supplementary supervision due to definitions in 
the sectoral directives such as the CRD and the insurance directives.156 In order to ensure 
that the necessary supervisory tools can be applied, it will introduce the term 'mixed financial 
holding company' into the relevant provisions on consolidated/group supervision in the 
sectoral directives.157 To date, consistent treatment under supplementary supervision has 
been hampered by the lack of relevant information to properly assess group risks.158  
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The EC also proposes to amend its Directive on insurance and reinsurance groups to 
include mixed financial holding companies.159  It has observed that comprehensive 
monitoring of group risks in large, complex, internationally operating conglomerates, is only 
possible when competent authorities gather supervisory information and plan supervisory 
measures beyond the national scope of their mandate.160  
 
One mechanism that has proven helpful in dealing with cross-border insolvencies of 
corporate groups in sectors outside of the financial sector are the use of protocols, which are 
cross-border agreements of the principal parties to the proceeding, endorsed by the courts of 
the jurisdictions where there are proceedings, which set out a series of procedures for notice, 
stakeholder participation, the relationship of insolvency professionals in different 
jurisdictions, and court-to-court cooperation and communication.161 Such protocols could be 
helpful for cross-border proceedings of financial conglomerates where the insolvency 
engages multiple insolvency statutes, given the different nature of entities within the financial 
conglomerate. 
 
III.   Bank Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs from the 
governance of corporations because of prudential regulation, banks’ significance to the 
financial system, the different nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the 
existence of deposit insurance. Bank governance also differs because banks’ liquidity 
producing function is based on maturity mismatches, but depends on continued access to 
liquidity from deposits, turnover of commercial paper and interbank lending.162 Leverage in 
banks has different implications from that of corporations, and governance decisions must 
take account of these important distinctions.   
 
When a bank is experiencing liquidity problems or financial distress, its shareholders have 
incentive to encourage higher risk strategies, because they enjoy any upside value generated 
by the strategies and do not bear the consequences of downside as their investments are 
already at risk or lost. Even shareholders with substantial block holding positions in banks, 
often in European jurisdictions, may not have the incentive to monitor managers, where 
their interests are already underwater. Governance structures fail to account for the residual 
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interest in the financial institution at that point, which is held by depositors and creditors.   
 
Restructuring can take many forms, some of which may address governance problems that 
created or contributed to the financial distress and others that may not. Workouts can 
involve a compromise of claims, a restructuring of debt and equity, forbearance and 
renegotiated terms of credit, sale of part or all of the business to new equity holders through 
stalking horse processes or credit bidding, and/or replacing directors and officers and 
implementing new governance structures. The underlying premise is that if there is a viable 
business plan that enhances the overall value of the bank’s business and offers greater 
protection to economic stakeholders, then there should be a mechanism to remedy 
governance problems and facilitate such a plan. 
 
In the myriad of reports generated in the first year of the financial crisis, the corporate 
governance of banks was not mentioned. However, in 2009, the Larosière Report concluded 
that banks’ corporate governance was one of the most important failures underlying the 
crisis.163 Boards of directors had failed to understand the nature or scale of risks and thus 
were ineffective in their monitoring and oversight. There was a lack of effective control 
mechanisms that contributed significantly to excessive risk taking; and the polycentric nature 
of financial regulation created a gap in oversight of bank corporate governance.164  
 
The opaque nature of many structured financial products meant that directors in their 
decision making regarding managerial compensation were rewarding conduct that ran 
counter to the bank’s stability and soundness. Moreover, derivatives held by banks were very 
sensitive to exogenous factors that increased risks without decisions to do so by directors; 
hence, directors and officers were often not in control of the risk profile.165  Banks are 
heavily dependent on the confidence of depositors and creditors in their governance, and the 
failure of confidence arising out of the liquidity shortages made them subject to runs on the 
bank.  
 
An independent review of corporate governance in the UK banking industry by the UK 
government also found that there were serious deficiencies in governance and prudential 
oversight in the period before the crisis.166 Due to the opaqueness of banks’ balance sheets, 
incentive contracts with managers were ineffective in aligning the interests of managers and 
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shareholders.167 The study reported that boards of directors found it difficult to assess 
whether management actually met their performance targets, concluding that where a 
significant amount of management’s total remuneration is equity based, managers will focus 
on short-term results and have an incentive to increase the bank’s leverage.168  
 
Some of the largest bank failures indicate governance concerns. At Northern Rock, directors 
either acquiesced or were culpable in their failure of oversight. The UK Financial Services 
Authority fined David Jones, former finance director of Northern Rock PLC £320,000 and 
imposed a ban for continued misreporting on a monthly basis to the bank’s assets and 
liabilities committee and, on a quarterly basis, to the Council of Mortgage Lenders.169 There 
were also warning signals regarding Lehman’s governance prior to its collapse; and 
subsequent to its failure, the court-appointed examiner found financial reporting 
manipulation.170   
 
i. Bank Governance Reform 
 
Whatever one’s normative perspective on the degree of regulatory intervention required, the 
events of the past two years indicate that some further development in respect of bank 
governance is required, which likely should involve both enhanced supervisory oversight and 
a more nuanced model of bank self governance. The degree to which the private financial 
services sector should remedy the identified governance problems continues to be hotly 
contested. 
 
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, World 
Bank and other transnational organizations developed principles and standards of effective 
governance.171 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision observes that from “a banking 
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industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in which the business and 
affairs of banks are governed by the board of directors and senior management that affects 
how they set corporate objectives; operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis; meet 
the obligation of accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests of 
other recognized stakeholders; align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation 
that banks will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations; and protect the interests of depositors.”172  
 
Good governance is linked with effective oversight of a bank’s business activities; the Basel 
Committee encourages banks to comply with eight high-level principles, offering detailed 
standards in its guidelines. The principles are aimed at all types of bank capital and 
governance structures, including publicly traded or privately held, but recognize a 
proportional aspect to banks’ ability to comply.  Directors should be qualified for their 
positions, and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank, including 
appropriate responsibility for the operations and financial soundness of the bank. These 
qualifications include the skills to understand the bank’s risk profile, approve its overall 
business strategy, risk policy and risk management procedures; select, monitor and, where 
necessary, replace key executives; provide oversight of the senior management; have 
oversight of strategic objectives and values; set and enforce clear lines of responsibility 
throughout organization; ensure sound internal audit controls; understand the bank’s 
operational structure and complexity of structured products; and meet regularly with senior 
management and internal auditors. The guidelines call for an appropriate number of 
independent non-executive qualified directors that have “an adequate collective knowledge 
of each of the types of material activities of the bank”.173 The guidelines recommend that 
large banks have an audit committee, with a majority comprised of independent directors 
that have a clear understanding of their governance duties regarding risk management.  
 
These governance guidelines were published in 2006. Many are responsive to agency issues 
raised by bank governance structures. Unfortunately, principles do not equal change. The 
principles aimed at effective bank governance existed before the crisis, but they were not 
effectively adopted such that they may have prevented some bank failures. 174  One question 
is whether there now exist the appropriate incentives to bring such governance standards 
into practice, or whether there continues to be a problem with encouraging compliance with 
these non-binding international norms. 
 
ii. Accountability to Stakeholders 
 
There needs to be a deeper understanding of prudential oversight and the obligation of 
directors to ensure the safety and soundness of the bank or other financial institution. One 
approach is to substitute shareholder supremacy with stakeholder supremacy either by 
substituting the shareholder-only-oriented goal of value maximization with that of depositor-
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restrained value maximization, or, slightly less far-reaching, by requiring directors and 
officers to take the interests of depositors into account.175 Directors should act in best 
interests of the financial institution as a whole and its beneficiaries, including depositors, 
creditors and investors. Such interests include ensuring appropriate limits on leverage; 
reasonable liquidity; protection of depositors; and addressing the agency issues. Bank 
corporate governance should take account of both types of stakeholders and the stability of 
the financial system, due to the systemic nature of bank activities.  
 
Another public policy question issue in need of serious consideration is the social utility of 
derivatives versus the harms; and the extent of a bank’s accountability to stakeholders where 
activities are highly speculative.  Arguably, there should be a partial restriction of their use by 
financial institutions that have prudential obligations.  The scope of any such limits is in 
urgent need of a public policy discussion. 
 
Governance responses should recognize differing interests in the financial system.  Interests 
that are affected are beyond private financial markets participants; they include employees, 
creditors, equity holders, depositors, and the broader public interest. Moreover, where the 
government has become a shareholder as a result of using public funds for a bail out, there 
may be a need to design principles of accountability for governments acting simultaneously 
as regulator, shareholder and creditor. 
 
iii. Director Obligations and Incentives 
 
The regulatory overlay of monitoring needs to be complemented by effective oversight 
within the banks’ corporate governance structure. There need to be appropriate incentives 
for directors to pursue the bank’s best interests. Boards must devote more time to 
governance and oversight. Directors must be willing and able to ensure that the risk 
management framework and risk appetite of the financial institution are appropriate. A 
number of policy questions should be explored. Should there be minimum length of board 
meetings, or limits on number of directorships held? Should regulators condition the 
availability of a due diligence defence on time spent on director duties? Should there be 
financial literacy qualifications? Arguably, board and director performance appraisal should 
be linked to risk management and assessment as well as profitability. There should be 
mechanisms to increase the relationship of decision makers with stakeholders, which could 
include election, review, and tying promotion to stakeholder support of overall governance. 
 
The classic view of director and officer performance-based compensation is that it aligns the 
interests of officers and shareholders, particularly where compensation is comprised of a 
substantial component of equity-based compensation, such as options and allocation of 
shares.  However, compensation practices that allowed officers to cash in equity based 
compensation on an ongoing or short-term basis created the opposite incentives. 
Performance targets that are linked to short-term realization create incentives for banks to 
move from longer term lower risk assets, such as mortgages, to higher risk structured 
financial products. As noted above, the Basel guidelines, which were not effectively adopted, 
called for boards to ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the 
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bank’s long-term objectives and strategy; and that remuneration of non-executive directors 
and executive directors and senior managers should be set in such a way that incentives do 
not overly depend on short-term performance and trading gains. 
 
Director and officer remuneration should be linked with long term health of bank. 
Compensation should be structured to reduce incentives to take excessive risk. It should 
reward effective oversight of regulatory compliance, independent monitoring of audit and 
operational functions, and responses to market changes.176 Officers should be incentivized to 
better understand risk in particular circumstances; identify risks of structured financial 
products; understand inappropriate risk concentration; shift risk stress tests from focus on 
past events to identifying new risks and potential outcomes and adjustments; and ensure a 
continuous understanding firm’s risk position compared with risk appetite.  
 
Remuneration systems should also focus on staff whose activities can have a material impact 
on the risk exposure of the financial institution. For employees with responsibility for risk 
and compliance functions, remuneration should be linked to achieving safety and soundness.  
Regulators could create guidance or standards that specify criteria for the link. Another 
governance strategy is to accord more authority to the risk management function within 
financial institutions to counterbalance risk-takers, including direct access to the board of 
directors, to allow timely review, evaluation and action to refine strategies and a predictive 
mechanism for discerning and addressing evolving risks. 
 
Globally, the majority of bank boards are comprised of inside directors or cross-sector 
appointment of directors that are not independent.177 Yet, prescience requires financial skills, 
and a capacity for independent second look at decisions. Does a director’s willingness to test 
or challenge strategies need independence from the banking sector or is there another 
approach that will ensure challenges occur? Any governance improvement must ensure the 
appropriate balance of diversity, independence and skills of directors. Regulators face time 
lags and information asymmetries, and thus governance norms should complement and 
enhance legal standards. 
 
In summary, the issue of director obligations requires considerably more scrutiny and public 
policy debate. Arguably, there should be a requirement for directors to take account of the 
sustainability of the bank, adopting less risky strategies and increasing the quality of bank 
long-term risk management strategy. Any corporate governance reform must not lose sight 
of the prudential nature of banks and thus of director obligations. There is a need to change 
incentives to ensure management and directors are more prudent.  
 
iv. Early Intervention in Governance Where There are Solvency Concerns 
 
Another option is to have a system of early intervention where governance issues are 
identified, including the authority to remove the directors and senior management of a 
failing financial institution and hold them to account. The EU proposals discussed above 
have the potential to effect this governance shift.  A working example of an effective system 
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is the Canadian system of early intervention, described in some detail here.  It works with the 
directors and officers of banks at early stages of problems, affording them considerable 
opportunity to remedy problems before the government intervenes to remedy the financial 
instability. 
 
In Canada, the Office of the Supervisor of Financial Institutions (OSFI)178 has an 
intervention process that enables it and the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(CDIC), Canada’s national deposit insurance fund, to identify areas of liquidity and solvency 
concern at an early stage and intervene effectively so as to minimize losses to depositors.179 
OSFI supervises and regulates all banks in Canada and all federally incorporated or 
registered trust and loan companies, insurance companies, cooperative credit associations, 
fraternal benefit societies and private pension plans, a total of 1,836 firms.180 
 
Canada’s statutes governing banks and other financial institutions provide a wide range of 
discretionary intervention powers that allow the supervisor to intervene to address 
governance concerns that may arise with federally-regulated deposit-taking institutions 
(banks).181 OSFI conducts risk-based assessments of the safety and soundness of banks and 
other financial institutions.182 All assessments made throughout the intervention process 
consider the unique circumstances of the financial institution, including the nature, scope, 
complexity and risk profile.  There are 5 levels of assessment. 
 
The first level is No significant problems/Normal activities, whereby OSFI determines that the 
institution’s financial conditions are sufficient and that circumstances do not indicate 
significant problems or control deficiencies. The bank’s performance has been satisfactory to 
good, with most key indicators comparable or in excess of industry norms.183 OSFI assesses 
the financial condition and operating performance, reviewing information obtained from 
financial reporting requirements and management reporting to the board; and offers a 
composite risk rating.184 
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Then Stage 1 is an Early Warning Stage, where OSFI has identified deficiencies in the 
institution’s financial condition, policies or procedures that could lead to problems if they are 
not promptly addressed. Example conditions include the combination of the institution’s 
overall net risk and its capital and earnings compromises the institution’s resilience; or the 
institution has issues in its risk management that, although not serious enough to present a 
threat to solvency, could deteriorate into more serious problems if not addressed.185 OSFI 
notifies management, the board and the external auditor by way of a supervisory letter, 
requiring bank officers to take measures to mitigate or rectify the identified deficiencies. 
OSFI may meet with management, the board of directors and/or the external auditor to 
outline concerns and discuss remedial actions; may send a notice of assessment surcharge to 
the institution; monitor the institution on an escalating basis by increasing the frequency of 
reporting requirements and/or expanding the level of detail of information that the bank is 
required to submit; conduct enhanced or more frequent supervisory reviews, or direct the 
institution’s internal specialists to conduct reviews that focus on particular areas of concern 
such as asset or loan security valuations. OFSI may also determine the need for a prudential 
agreement with the institution for the purpose of implementing measures designed to 
maintain or improve the safety and soundness of the institution.186 At this stage, OSFI also 
has authority to require the financial institution to increase its capital or impose business 
restrictions or compliance directions on the bank in appropriate circumstances.  
 
The CDIC would not normally intervene at Stage 1, but it might place the bank on its 
“watchlist”; or levy a premium surcharge if it fails to comply with the policy of deposit 
insurance that requires the bank to have in place appropriate, effective and prudent practices 
with respect to corporate governance, risk management, liquidity and capital management, 
and controls.187 CDIC can also request that the bank or entity that controls it provide an 
undertaking to rectify areas of concern. 
 
At Stage 2, called Risk to Financial Viability or Solvency, the bank poses material safety and 
soundness concerns. At this stage, OSFI has identified problems that could deteriorate into a 
serious situation if not addressed promptly, although there is not an immediate threat to 
solvency. Examples here include: the combination of the institution’s overall net risk, capital 
and earnings makes it vulnerable to adverse business and economic conditions that may pose 
a serious threat to its financial viability unless effective corrective action is implemented; and 
the bank has risk management issues that could deteriorate into more serious problems if 
not addressed promptly. OSFI measures at this stage include requiring the institution to 
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incorporate in the business plan appropriate remedial measures aimed at rectifying problems 
within a specified time frame; imposing more frequent reporting requirements; conducting 
follow-up supervisory reviews more frequently and/or enlarging their scope; requiring the 
external auditor to enlarge the scope of the review of the financial statements; requiring the 
institution to conduct a special audit to be performed by an outside auditor; and/or 
developing a contingency plan to enable OSFI to be ready to take rapid control of the 
institution or its assets in case of further deterioration.188  
 
The CDIC at Stage 2 may send the chief executive officer or board chairperson a formal 
report if the bank is not in compliance with a CDIC by-law or is in breach of its policy of 
deposit insurance, including the condition requiring that member institutions have 
appropriate, effective and prudent practices with respect to corporate governance, risk 
management, liquidity, capital management and controls.189 If CDIC is not satisfied with 
progress made in rectifying the situation, CDIC must inform the bank and the Minister of 
Finance. CDIC may, subject to the Minister's advice that it is not in the public interest to do 
so, terminate the member institution's policy of deposit insurance, on notice;190 conduct a 
preparatory examination if CDIC believes that the making of a payment in respect of 
deposits held by the bank is imminent and that it would be in the best interest of depositors 
and CDIC that preparations be made to make that payment as soon as possible;191 or apply 
to court for an order directing the bank to comply with the CDICA.192 
  
Stage 3 is where OSFI determines that the future financial viability of the bank in serious 
doubt because the bank has failed to remedy the problems that were identified at Stage 2 and 
the situation is worsening. The financial institution has severe safety and soundness concerns 
and is experiencing problems that pose a material threat to its solvency. The combination of 
the institution’s overall net risk, capital and earnings makes it vulnerable to adverse business 
and economic conditions or there are control deficiencies that pose a serious threat to its 
solvency unless effective corrective action is promptly implemented. OSFI may direct 
external specialists or professionals to assess certain areas such as quality of loan security, 
asset values, sufficiency of reserves, etc.; enhance the scope of business restrictions that have 
already been imposed on the bank and/or expand the level of detail of information that the 
bank is required to submit to OSFI; place OSFI staff at the institution to monitor the 
situation on an ongoing basis; expand contingency planning; and communicate to 
management and the board of directors the importance of considering resolution options 
such as restructuring the institution or seeking a prospective purchaser. 
 
The CDIC at this Stage can minimize its exposure by providing support for a restructuring 
transaction by taking such measures as acquiring assets from the bank; making or 
guaranteeing loans or advances, with or without security, to the bank; and making or 
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guaranteeing a deposit with the bank.193 
 
Finally, at Stage 4, the OSFI has determined that non-viability or insolvency is imminent and 
the bank is experiencing severe financial difficulties and has deteriorated to such an extent 
that the institution has failed to meet regulatory capital requirements in conjunction with an 
inability to rectify the situation on an immediate basis. The statutory conditions for taking 
control have been met; and/or the institution has failed to develop and implement an 
acceptable business plan such that insolvency is inevitable within a short period of time. 
OSFI can assume temporary control of the institution or its assets, unless the Minister 
advises OSFI that it is not in the public interest to do so. OSFI can request that the Attorney 
General of Canada apply for a winding-up order in respect of the institution where its assets 
or the institution is under the control of the Superintendent. 
 
CDIC’s activities at this stage may involve cancelling the policy of deposit insurance of the 
bank if CDIC is of the opinion that the bank is or is about to become insolvent;194 initiating 
the financial institution restructuring provisions (FIRP), following receipt of the formal 
OSFI report that the bank has ceased, or is about to cease, to be viable or circumstances 
exist that would allow the Superintendent to take control and grounds would exist to make a 
winding-up order.195 The CDIC asks the Minister of Finance to recommend that the 
Governor in Council issue a FIRP order if a restructuring transaction is likely to be 
expeditiously entered into and is consistent with CDIC’s objects. It may also apply for a 
winding-up order under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act where CDIC concludes the bank 
is or is about to become insolvent, unless the Minister advises that it would not be in the 
public interest to do so. The CDIC may act as a liquidator or receiver if appointed as such. 
CDIC gives public notice of the termination or cancellation of the member institution’s 
policy of deposit insurance if the public interest requires that such notice be given.196 
 
As at March 31, 2010, there had been 50 staged institutions, the majority of the staged 
institutions were in the Stage 1 Early Warning stage.197 The year prior there were 56 
interventions.  For the year ending March 31, 2008, there were 25 staged institutions, of 
which 22 were at stage 1 and three were at stage 2.198  OSFI’s early intervention allows 
governance issues to be addressed long before insolvency, resulting in almost no bank 
failures in Canada. While there are arguably other reasons for the soundness of the Canadian 
system, such as the structure of the sector, it is likely that the early intervention has been 
helpful in remedying governance issues on a timely basis.  OSFI issues a Composite Risk 
Rating (CRR ) that represents its overall assessment of an institution’s safety and soundness, 
with four ratings of low, moderate, above average and high risk. As at the end of March 
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2010, OSFI assigned a low or moderate CRR to 88% of all rated institutions and rated 12%, 
48 financial institutions, as either above average or high risk. Those numbers were 89% and 
11% respectively as at March 31, 2009.199  
 
The five stages under Canadian banking law ensure that governance is corrected, business 
plans adjusted and liquidity risks are addressed long before insolvency. Given the importance 
of banks to the financial system, this prudential approach makes sense. Where the financial 
supervisor has had several levels of intervention prior to a financial institution filing under 
insolvency legislation, arguably, at the point of an insolvency filing, the directors and officers 
have had a full opportunity to remedy the governance problems of the firm. Hence, it does 
not make sense to afford them yet another opportunity to remain in control. This situation is 
in contrast to normal corporate insolvency proceedings in many countries, whereby 
commencement of insolvency proceedings often represents the first stage of remedying the 
governance, financial and operational problems of the insolvent company.200 
 
The EU bank resolution framework, discussed above, includes a number of governance 
initiatives, including a requirement to prepare resolution plans to ensure adequate planning 
for financial stress or failure. Supervisors may also be given the authority to appoint a special 
manager for a limited period of up to one year to take over the management, or assist the 
existing management, of a bank that is failing to meet the requirements of the CRD and has 
not developed or implemented a credible recovery plan. The special manager would exercise 
all the powers of the management, but its primary duty would be to restore the soundness of 
the institution.201 
 
vi. Deposit Insurance or Guarantee Schemes 
 
Another issue that relates to governance are deposit insurance funds. Deposit insurance 
guarantee funds have been aimed at protecting small investors, providing a guarantee, to a 
capped amount, on bank savings or the value of insurance policies.  They also serve as a 
confidence enhancing aspect of financial services, reducing the risk of runs on a bank. The 
amount of coverage under such funds has traditionally been limited, in order that banks not 
have an incentive to shirk their prudential obligations.  
 
One problem during the crisis was that deposit guarantee funds in many jurisdictions were 
not prefunded. The assumption was that if a bank failed, other banks in the jurisdiction 
would be available to meet the deposit guarantee promise. The structure did not account for 
multiple bank failures in the same jurisdiction.  The lacking of funding then meant that 
governments had little choice but to offer bailout funding, as depositors’ savings would be 
lost otherwise.  However, such a strategy carried with it moral hazard; banks understood that 
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they were not required to prefund, and the lack of protection for such depositors meant that 
the banks could count on the risk of depositor losses to leverage government bailouts at a 
time of financial distress.  
 
A number of jurisdictions have now moved to increase the amount of coverage for deposit 
insurance or guarantee schemes. For example, the EU amended its Directive deposit-
guarantee schemes to require member states to raise the existing minimum coverage level of 
20,000 € to 100,000 € by 31 December 2010.202  The US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation raised the minimum coverage level of 100,000 USD until December 2013 to 
250,000 USD; and it set up a temporary liquidity program, allowing US banks to issue certain 
senior unsecured debt guaranteed by the FDIC.203 
 
Deposit guarantee schemes do not have the same purpose as bank resolution guarantee 
funds; however, some countries use their schemes to provide certain forms of resolution 
financing, including some EU member states. In Canada, the CDIC can control its exposure 
by providing support for a restructuring transaction; making or guaranteeing loans or 
advances, with or without security, to the bank; and making or guaranteeing a deposit with 
the bank.204 The EC has proposed that deposit guarantee schemes could be used for bank 
resolution measures involving the transfer of deposits to another entity, provided that the 
amount of funds used does not exceed the amount that would have been necessary to repay 
depositors; any additional costs should fall to the resolution funds.205 
 
Deposit guarantee funds can weaken the incentives for stakeholders to monitor governance 
and temper higher risk business practices because the insurance offers baseline protection 
for depositors.206  However, the amounts protected by deposit insurance schemes are 
relatively modest, targeted at the most vulnerable small depositors. Even with the recent 
increases in the amount of deposit insurance required, significant market players or small to 
medium businesses are not protected for most of their investments; hence they may not 
have an incentive to shirk monitoring through deposit insurance, and may hold officers 
more accountable. Given that deposit insurance guarantee funds do not protect banks’ 
deposits in other banks, arguably, interbank incentives to monitor are not reduced by the 
existence of deposit insurance.    
 
vii.  Appropriate Oversight of Securitization 
 
Banks should retain a sufficiently strong economic interest in the securitized assets they sell. 
In general, this requirement would mean retaining some exposure to securitization cash 
flows where payoffs are especially sensitive to how well the bank performs its origination, 
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monitoring and servicing activities.207 Such requirements could address some of the 
immediate agency issues associated with the speculative market.208  The US Dodd-Frank Act 
requires that companies that sell products like mortgage-backed securities retain at least 5% 
of the credit risk, unless the underlying loans meet standards that reduce riskiness. It requires 
issuers to disclose more information about the underlying assets and to analyze the quality of 
the underlying assets. This minimal requirement should be applied to all securitization.  
 
Arguably, requiring 5% “skin in the game” may be limited in its effectiveness in creating 
appropriate incentives to monitor the products, as the threshold of retaining economic 
interest is so low, it may simply be viewed as the price of participating in the market, and not 
create the hoped for incentives to monitor the quality of credit decisions. There needs to be 
a public policy discussion as to whether this amount is large enough to change conduct or 
prevent harms. 
 
A further requirement for well functioning financial markets is that investors in 
securitization instruments should have a good understanding of the associated risks, and 
thus the opaque nature of financial products needs to be made considerably more 
transparent. 
 
IV. Concluding Thoughts 
 
The global discussion on preventive measures in respect of financial institutions continues.  
One approach to discerning policy options is to consider what is prudential, prescient and 
pragmatic for financial institutions going forward. 
 
i.  Prudential  
 
In terms of prudential obligations, directors and officers of financial institutions should act 
in the best interests of the organization in the long term, taking account of the interests of 
beneficiaries: depositors, life insurance policyholders, deposit insurance funds, creditors and 
investors. Taking account of diverse interests may serve as a mechanism to adopt less risky 
strategies and increase the quality of bank long-term risk management strategies.  Prudential 
conduct may mean limits on leveraging and reasonable liquidity; and addressing agency 
problems in order to maintain confidence in financial system. Prudential obligations should 
include protection of depositors and insurance policyholders. One policy question is should 
directors and officers have a direct fiduciary obligation or duty of care to deposit holders? 
Bank corporate governance should take account of both stakeholders and the stability of the 
financial system, due to the systemic nature of bank activities. Governance could be more 
responsive to the conflicting interests of managers either by direct representation of broad 
interests on the board of directors or by regulator imperative. One question for public policy 
discussion, given the prudential nature of banks, is whether there should be at least some 
director elections by non-shareholding stakeholders? 
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It makes sense to implement remuneration schemes that counteract incentives at all levels 
for short-term returns to potential detriment of sustainability. Financial reward should be 
separated from excessive risk taking.  Directors and officers should be able to demonstrate 
to the regulator that they have sufficient knowledge and control over the bank’s risk profile. 
There should also be authority to remove the directors and senior management of a failing 
financial institution and hold to them to account for failure to meet their prudential 
obligations. A financially distressed financial institution should ensure that there is sufficient 
expertise and resources to govern resolution of the distress.  
 
The debate about effective bank corporate governance raises the question of why corporate 
law should intervene over and above standards for acceptable level of risk taking established 
by prudential regulation.  Arguably, there is need to change incentives for management and 
directors to be more prudent, which in turn might overcome shortcomings in regulatory 
resources and ability. At the same time, it is important that new regulatory measures do not 
seriously impair financial activity necessary for liquidity function, creating a further credit 
crisis.   
 
ii. Prescient 
 
There should be mechanisms to increase the relationship of decision makers with 
stakeholders, such as election, review of activities or tying promotion to stakeholder 
satisfaction. Public disclosures under financial services law could enhance the quality and 
accessibility of disclosure to stakeholders and regulators. Strategic planning should link risk 
management to achievement the financial institution’s overall objectives. Regulators could 
create guidance or standards that specify criteria for that link.  There should be enhanced 
oversight of regulatory compliance, and independent monitoring of audit and operational 
functions and corporate responses to market changes.  There should be public policy 
discussion of the extent to which gatekeepers should also be made responsible for their part 
of regulatory compliance.   
 
Financial institutions and regulators need to develop a better understanding of risk in 
particular circumstances; including identifying the downside risks of new structured financial 
products as they come on the market; and understanding inappropriate risk concentration. 
Risk stress tests should shift from their focus on past events to identifying new risks and 
potential outcomes and adjustments.  Directors and officers should have continuous 
understanding the firm’s risk position compared with its risk appetite. Employees 
responsible for risk monitoring and assessment should have more authority to 
counterbalance risk-takers, including direct access to the board where there are concerns 
about the level of risk.  Risk management employees should be considered senior 
management, meeting regularly with the board to allow timely review, evaluation and action 
to refine strategies. Financial institutions should develop predictive mechanisms for 
discerning and address evolving risks and real time communication to board; rather than take 
false comfort in regulatory capital ratios. Prescience requires financial skills, but also a 
capacity for an independent second look at decisions.  
 
There is also a need to link financial sustainability with other aspects of social, environmental 
sustainability measures, including requiring reporting and use of widely accepted standards. 
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It is important to reduce conflicts of interest within the complex structure of global financial 
institutions and their interactions; such as professionals advising on investments while 
managing investment funds.  Remuneration should be more directly linked with the long 
term health of the bank, reducing incentives to take excessive risk. Remuneration systems 
should arguably also focus on target staff whose activities can have a material impact on the 
risk exposure of the financial institution. For employees in risk and compliance functions, 
remuneration could be tied to achieving sustainability. 
 
iii. Pragmatic 
 
Pragmatically, there should be governance and regulatory structures that operate on a timely 
and effective basis.  Governance standards should ensure the appropriate balance of 
independence and skills of directors. One way to accomplish this goal would be to enhance 
board diversity; do banks need some regulatory rule or guidance on this issue? 
 
The Basel principles for governance regarding the specialized skills and qualities of directors 
are aimed at ensuring that they engage in oversight of strategic objectives and values; set and 
enforce clear lines of responsibility throughout organization; ensure sound internal audit 
controls; and understand bank’s operational structure and complexity of structure or 
products, all important principles. Pragmatically, how do we transfer non-binding 
international principles into accepted practice?  One mechanism is to ensure appropriate 
incentives for directors and officers to pursue the bank’s best interests, though 
compensation, fear of liability or a combination of the two.  Boards must devote more time 
to governance and oversight. Directors must be willing and able to ensure the risk 
management framework and risk appetite of the financial institution are appropriate. Board 
and director performance should be linked to risk management and sustainability of the 
financial institution as well as profitability.  
 
Financial institutions and persons that create or recommend derivatives products should 
meet due diligence standards in examining and disclosing material adverse risk in derivative 
products being sold in the public market. New products could be certified as transparent 
before being sold. There should be remedies for purchasers from failure of those individuals 
recommending products to meet due diligence and disclosure obligations. Financial 
institutions that recommend derivatives products must train employees responsible for 
distributing risk products to understand and communicate the risk and understand conflicts 
of interest. 
 
Another pragmatic change would be mandatory disclosure during a restructuring proceeding 
of the real economic risks at stake, including disclosure of the amount of debt that has been 
hedged by creditors that seek to exercise their voting or oversight rights in a restructuring 
proceeding.  Lack of transparency now means that the debtor bank and other creditors are 
not aware of who is bearing the real economic risk of bank failure, inhibiting the potential 
for a viable business restructuring plan.209 The court’s consideration of any restructuring plan 
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should take account of economic interests at risk, either by requiring that voting on a 
restructuring plan is premised on the real economic interests in the bank’s insolvency or 
granting courts authority to weigh actual economic interests when considering parties’ 
exercise of voting rights.210 
 
As noted above, regulatory and governance responses to the financial crisis should recognize 
differing interests in the financial system; interests affected are beyond private financial 
markets participants and include employees, creditors, equity holders, depositors, and the 
broader public interest. 
   
These suggestions all require further public policy debate. The initiatives globally reflect a 
growing consensus that the harms caused by the financial crisis need a timely and 
coordinated response. In the context of that response, bank supervisors and other regulators 
are working to find the appropriate mix of prudential oversight and private sector 
governance. The comprehensive reforms, if implemented on a timely basis, are likely to 
address a number of the issues raised by the financial crisis. Equally, however, they raise a 
number of important policy questions about whether the reforms have addressed the full 
range of contributing factors and whether they go far enough in altering the pre-crisis 
incentives in the banking sector. 
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